Pressures on post-industrial societies: Better is more or less state welfare?

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Short summary
In this article we argue that while contemporary comparative welfare state research has advanced our knowledge of how welfare states respond to exogenous and endogenous pressures, then the nature and implications of these pressures themselves on post-industrial societies remain somewhat unknown. In the research literature phenomena such as globalization, europeanization, demographics, individualization and changing labour markets are often claimed to put considerable pressure on welfare states. Through an examination of the literature we analyse which of the alleged pressures are real ‘crises’ or ‘challenges’ to welfare states and which pressures should only be considered as ‘controversies’, i.e. phenomena whose impacts are nonsignificant, ambiguous or have not been asserted. Finally, we suggest that pressures on post-industrial societies may not, as is commonly believed, be countered with retrenchment and restructuring of welfare states. In fact, some pressures seem to call for more rather than less welfare state.

Introduction
The work of Esping-Andersen (1990) on the “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” marks a turning point in comparative welfare state research. Drawing on the insights of earlier research, Esping-Andersen distinguishes the historical development of three distinct configurations of state welfare and social policy regimes that are by now classic starting points for welfare state scholars, i.e. the Social Democratic, the Conservative and the Liberal welfare state regimes. By doing so he discards the tendencies in earlier research of viewing the welfare state and its historical development as a universal and a one-dimensional phenomenon. Acknowledging the existence of different types of welfare state provided a new locus of interest for the importance of welfare state diversity.

Hence, “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” spurred a fast growing and by now extensive body of research that has scrutinised the diversity of contemporary welfare states, the structural and social pressures associated with different welfare state regimes as well as the policies aimed at reforming welfare states (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1996; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Ferrera and Rhodes 2000; Kuhnle 2000). The thrust of this research in recent years has been on the impact of economic and social pressures in different welfare state regimes, and in particular on investigating how pressures are ‘filtered’ by regimes into distinct policy responses and reforms. In other words, comparative welfare state research has tended to be the trade of political scientists with the prime focus on the meso-level: political institutions, power configurations, and policy processes.

In much of this literature, pressures on contemporary post-industrial societies supposedly fuel demands and needs for welfare state reforms that imply a curtailment of state welfare (e.g. Mishra 1999; Gilbert 2002). Scholars emphasising the diversity of welfare states have introduced the concept of welfare state ‘restructuring’ (adaptation, adjustment etc.) to grasp the fact that welfare reform is multifaceted and entails more than retrenchment (Bonoli et al 2000; Pierson 2001a). For example, Pierson (2001b) suggests that policy reform in the three welfare state regimes takes place along three general strategies of cost containment, re-commodification, and recalibration. Consequently, welfare state reforms may be just as much about restructuring as about retrenchment.

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While this research provides important insights into the diversity and reform paths of welfare states, a number of issues have yet to be adequately addressed. In this article, we argue that too little attention has been paid to investigating the societal pressures themselves that may or may not facilitate welfare reform. Today it is commonplace to argue that the welfare state is somehow adapting to economic, political and social pressures in post-industrial societies. These perceived pressures stem from globalisation and Europeanisation, ageing populations as well as changing labour markets and family structures, just to mention a few of the usual suspects.

In the following sections we challenge the dominant view that the welfare state is reacting to a set number of societal pressures. Weighing the evidence on needs and possibilities for welfare state reform through a critical literature review we make a twofold argument. First, we argue that some of the perceived pressures have little, if any, impact on the welfare state. To the extent that these do influence welfare state reform such pressures tend, on the whole, to call for more, rather than less state welfare. This is not least because social needs with respect to e.g. labour markets and families have become much more diverse in post-industrial societies compared with the traditional, industrial era. Second, we point out that most of the contemporary pressures on post-industrial societies do not relate to welfare states per se, but rather to post-industrial societies more specifically. Consequently, the conceptual notions that pressures are tied specifically to the welfare state institution often found in contemporary research should be widened to include a society-centered perspective.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section we outline the conceptual frame of reference. Which theoretical concepts of “pressures” have been used in the literature and which ones should we use to capture the diversity of contemporary welfare state pressures? In the following sections we discuss the perceived pressures on post-industrial societies as these are found to influence current welfare state reforms.

The short history of welfare state pressures
The concepts of the pressures that face welfare states have changed in content over the past four decades or so, but the idea that welfare states are continually encountering some specific kind of pressure is by no means new to comparative welfare state research (cf. Alber 1988; Esping-Andersen 1999; Jæger and Kvist 2001). The notion of “pressure” is used in this context as the theoretical term for denoting the objective forces that strain the welfare state. It includes the whole range of economic, political, and social forces both endogenous and exogenous to welfare states that have been identified in the literature. Table 1 presents the four most important theoretical concepts of welfare-state pressures evident from the literature since the 1960s.

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In the 1960s and early 1970s writers like Philip Cutright, Frederick Pryor and Harold Wilensky saw the emergence of the welfare state as essentially a functional response to the new social problems that emerged with industrialism, urbanisation, demographic alterations in the populations, and the maturing of the capitalist economy (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958; Cutright 1965; Pryor 1968; Wilensky 1975). These pressures were seen as being curbed by the growing welfare states in tandem with high economic growth.

By the early 1970s economic recession and a resurgence of (neo-)marxist (O’Connor 1973; Gough 1979; Offe 1984) and (neo-)liberal thinking (Kristol 1971; King 1975; Hayek 1994) prompted a
much more pessimistic interpretation of both the pressures faced by welfare states as well as their possibilities of handling these pressures. Welfare states were now deemed to be in states of crisis for a number of reasons, notably because of the conflicting aims of at the same time wanting to generate tax revenues and to uphold popular support. The consequences of the crises also manifested themselves in fiscal instability, political uncontrollability, and diminishing social solidarity in the family and in civil society institutions. The pressures were thus viewed mostly as vested in macroeconomic conditions. It was widely believed that the external pressures following the economic recessions of the 1970s would ‘trigger’ the structural problems inherent in the Western welfare states and that these would change radically.

Since the early 1990s perceptions of pressures to welfare state development changed from being viewed as jointly endogenous and exogenous to mostly exogenous “challenges”, and the question of welfare state retrenchment and restructuring as responses to exogenous pressures have since dominated the literature (Pierson 1994; Clayton and Pontusson 1998; Scarbrough 2000; Millar 2002). At the same time the effects of economic and political internationalisation on states’ capacities for securing and controlling their fiscal bases and political sovereignty came into focus of research (Katzenstein 1985; Schwartz 2001). Economic and political pressures, often in the form of economic globalization and political integration within the EU, were now treated as independent variables affecting welfare states’ possibilities of reform and systemic restructuring (e.g. Bonoli et al. 2000; Taylor-Gooby 2001; Pierson 2001a).

Over the last forty years, the nature and scope of pressures on welfare states have thus been conceptualised quite differently. Interestingly, the question of whether these pressures are empirically observable, and to which degree they might pertain to welfare societies more generally rather than welfare states per se, has not been investigated much since the welfare state itself was the primary object of study. An underlying causal assumption in the literature on welfare state pressures is that policy reform is a virtually automatic response.

However, recent research has demonstrated that, even in light of persistent problems of low economic growth and high unemployment during the past decades, the many European welfare states have in fact been remarkably resilient to profound retrenchment and that state welfare in some areas are even expanding. What is more, countries least exposed to ‘permanent austerity’ (Pierson 2001b) have expanded state welfare; that is ‘change without challenge’ (Goul Andersen 2001). Such findings challenge the causal assumption found in earlier research, and we need to reconsider which pressures on welfare states are more important than others. As a consequence, in this review article we introduce the concept of ‘controversy’ in addition to the familiar vocabulary of ‘crisis’ and ‘challenge’. This concept is used when we judge that the impact of some of the alleged pressures found in the research literature has not, when reconsidered critically, been substantiated. This is, for example, our judgement in the case of the effects of globalization on welfare states. Thus, when reviewing the literature we use the notion of ‘controversy’ in cases, first, when the specific pressure is contested theoretically, and second, when empirical consequences of pressures are ambiguous or have not been found to be of significance to welfare states. This is also the case when evidence suggests that pressures pertain to post-industrial societies rather than welfare states as such.

In the remainder of the article we review the contemporary pressures on welfare states that have been proposed in the research literature using this analytical distinction of crises, challenges and controversies. First, the exogenous pressures of globalization and Europeanization are discussed.
Second, we turn to the mainly endogenous pressures of demographic developments, changes in post-industrial labour markets and finally the question of the persisting popularity of public welfare programmes.

**External pressures - Globalization, Europeanization and migration**

Two particular pressures that are deemed as exogenous to national welfare states and which have caught considerable attention in recent years are those of globalization and Europeanization. Globalization is often portrayed as a multifaceted phenomenon affecting welfare states in many and diverse ways. In particular, the notion of economic globalization is highlighted in relation to social policy. The basic thrust in most of the economic globalization literature is that, as competition and deregulation in financial and capital markets have grown rapidly in the post-war period, and since national economies have increasingly become dependent on exports in internationalised markets, states have effectively lost control both over their means of revenue as well as rendered fiscal policy instruments ineffective (Cosh et al 1992; Mishra 1999). As a consequence, economic globalization has triggered a “race to the bottom” of social spending in that national welfare states, in their efforts to attract capital and cultivate markets for foreign investments, have been forced to strain or cut back on public spending. The result of this competitive adaptation on an international scale is that welfare states enter a vicious circle of outbidding each other in terms of stimulating favourable business climates, through such policies as tax exemption or reduction, lax job protection, low environmental standards, and infrastructural advantages, creating an international trend of what is often referred to as “downward harmonization” of social protection (Martin and Schumann 1997; Greider 1997; Crotty 2000).

While pessimistic interpretations of the impact of economic globalization on welfare states are clearly dominant, alternative scenarios do exist (see Bowles and Wagman 1997; Burgoon 2001). Some writers suggest that economic globalization and welfare state policies need not be in tension, not least because increased trade openness and economic vulnerability tends to foster demand for welfare compensation (Garrett and Lange 1991; Swank 1998). Yet others claim that the correlates of economic globalization, increased capital mobility, trade openness and deregulation of financial markets, has no significant impact on welfare states at all (e.g. Lipsey et al. 1995; Cline 1997). The main argument put forward in this literature is that the vast majority of all trade and economic activity still takes places within geographically close regions, and notably the US, Western Europe, and Japan. Additionally, while financial and trade market have surely been internationalised, so has the control and regulation of these markets through powerful international organizations and institutions (e.g. the WTO, the IMF, the EC, and NAFTA) (see Rieger and Leibfried 1998, 2001). As such, there need not be any direct causal link between economic globalization and welfare state policies.

The arguments developed in the studies of the impact of economic globalization on the welfare state remain tenuous for a number of important reasons. Firstly, a commonly accepted theoretical definition of the concept of economic globalization has yet to be developed. Different studies use different definitions of globalization which are often exceedingly abstract and sometimes mutually exclusive (e.g. Burgoon 2001; Carroll 2002). As a consequence there is little or no comparability between studies and thus no accumulative knowledge of the effects of globalization on the welfare state. Second, there is a lack of a consistent body of empirical studies of the impact of globalization on welfare state efforts (e.g. Rhodes 1996; Schwartz 2001). Early empirical studies like Cameron (1978) and more recent studies by Rodrik (1997), Garrett (1998), and Garrett and Mitchell (2001) among others find no conclusive support for the “downward harmonization” thesis in the OECD.
area. Rather, while empirical studies do not find unambiguous evidence for the (either positive or negative) effects of economic globalization, much evidence seems to indicate that developments within national states themselves (especially in labour markets and in demographic structures) or in technology exert far more important pressures on welfare states (e.g. Lipsey et al. 1995; Iversen and Cusack 2001). As such, the notion that there is a direct causal link between economic globalization and welfare state development remains contentious (Schwartz 2001). Arguably, as is highlighted by Pierson (2001a) and Scharpf and Schmidt (2000), the growing internationalisation and deregulation of economies on the whole has tended to reduce the number of effective policy instruments available to governments to control their political economies. This trend is well documented in comparative welfare state research, and it is much less controversial than the assumption of causal logic found in the globalization literature. Consequently, despite the popularity of the concept during the 1990s, we deem economic globalization as no more than a ‘controversy’ with respects to its impacts on the welfare state.

Does Europe matter?

Political concern about the impact of the EU on national welfare states is reflected in a growing literature. The interplay between the national welfare states and the supranational level in the EU is scrutinized in studies looking at the development of European integration in social policies as well as studies looking at the impact of European integration on national welfare states, the so-called Europeanization studies.

Accounts of how Europeanization and European integration affects national welfare states underline both intentional as well as unintentional aspects of this process. According to neo-functionalist integration theory intentional efforts and spill-over effects at the supranational level will result in harmonization of national policies. The Amsterdam Treaty from 1997 made employment among the prime objectives of the EU and also prohibits discrimination based on gender and ethnicity just as the Social Charter was incorporated in the Treaty itself (for the preceding development see Mosley 1990 and Leibfried 2000). This fact has resulted in three so-called European strategies for, respectively, employment, inclusion, and old age pensions, and more strategies are in the making. The strategies are backed up institutionally and financially by various funds, most notably the European Social Fund, and procedures such as setting up partnership projects and the drawing up, evaluation and monitoring of national action plans. At the same time, however, these strategies are based on the open method of coordination. This implies that national member states agree on common objectives, but are free to choose how they want meet these objectives, and there are no legal or economic forms of sanctioning in case of non-compliance.

When it comes to hard law only about ten directives directly affect social policy. The maternity directive (92/85/EEC) stipulates a maternity leave of a minimum of 14 weeks, and the parental leave directive (96/34/EEC) ensures a parental leave of three months and the right to absence from work in case of serious illness or injury within the family. Eight directives prohibit discrimination on grounds of gender, ethnicity, age and disability both in relation to employment and various aspects of social policy. These directives aim to secure that, for example, men and women are treated equally.

This lack of a fully-fledged European social policy fits well with findings in other studies of European integration that has flourished since the middle of the 1980s. These studies tend to treat

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2 Empirically, economic globalization is usually operationalized by e.g. the total volume of international trade, proportion of foreign direct investment relative to GDP, degree of financial openness, and low wage imports.
the EU as an international regime institutionalizing forms of collective action among nation states (for a critical review see Pierson 1996). Intergovernmentalists insist that member states are preoccupied with maintaining their sovereignty, and that the creation of supranational institutions only takes place when these are instruments for lowering transaction costs, allowing for collective action and diminish problems of information. Consequently, member states will only give increased power to the EU “in so far as it strengthens, rather than weakens, their control over domestic affairs” (Moravcik 1993: 507).

In addition to the intentional nature of EU-policies other authors maintain that indirect spillover effects may be transmitted from one policy area to another. This is not least due to pressures towards greater similarities in economic and fiscal policies, institutional arrangements and levels of provision in the EU member states (Streeck 1996; Hagen 1999; Leibfried and Pierson 2000). Nevertheless, a certain degree of schizophrenia can be detected as the same authors also note that the very existence of different institutions, both polity systems or policy programmes, render the creation of European social policies unlikely (e.g. Pierson 1996). For example, the different welfare regimes in Europe are likely to hamper the development of a uniform welfare model, as is also evident from recent empirical studies (Scharpf 1997; Kautto and Kvist 2002).

Moreover, Europeanization of welfare states may also come about as a by-product of the general political and economic integration of public policies in the EU (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Economic and social pressures – perceived or real – from the establishment of the EU with free movement of goods, services, capital, and labour may also be of significance. In fact, perhaps the most disputed EU threats for national welfare states concern social dumping and social tourism. The social dumping argument is a regional version of the globalization thesis that states that companies speculate in national labour market standards with regard to taxes, wages and job legislation, and that governments in response lower standards in order to retain or attract capital and companies (Alber and Standing 2000; Guillén and Matsaganis 2000).

There is nothing ‘social’ nor ‘touristique’ about the argument of social tourism which say that EU nationals from countries with poor social benefits migrate to countries with good and accessible social benefits. Currently, the coming enlargements of the EU fuels fear that such migration may come from the Eastern parts of Europe. Recent studies find that it is particularly labour markets in border regions in Austria and Germany that are most likely to be affected (for an overview see Commission of the European Communities 2001). Estimates of the scope of migration from new to old EU members after 10 to 15 years varies between 700,000 and 2.7 million persons and, after the accession of Bulgaria and Rumania, between 1.4 and 4.2 million. Despite such disagreement coming intra-community migration from the East to the West of Europe cannot match the increased demand for labour caused by ageing populations (see Fuchs and Thon 1999 for Germany). Hence, increased intra-community migration of workers does not constitute an insurance against ageing populations in the West, but rather some threat of brain drain from the East. In this respect improved social policies may help to retain workers in coming members states (see also Kovacs 2000).

Whereas there are little signs of direct impact on social policies, the stability pact of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) may hinder member states in pursuing other policies. The convergence criteria damper possibilities of leading an expansive fiscal policy even in times of sluggish economic growth and growing unemployment as currently witnessed in France and Germany. In
other words, the combination of EMU convergence criteria and the relative modest existence of EU social policies make the pressures on national welfare states from Europe controversial.

In sum, during the 1990s reference to ‘external pressures’ from the European context began to supplement established criticism against welfare state arrangements based on internal pressures (see Esping-Andersen 1999; Jæger and Kvist 2000; Kersbergen 2000). However, the bulk of empirical cross-national studies conclude that European integration has not processed far in the traditional areas of the welfare state and that claims of a Europeanization of welfare policies are difficult to sustain (Kuhnle 2000; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Taylor-Gooby 2001; Kauto et al. 2001; Kvist 2002). European social policy or a European welfare state is very small and fragmented, and national welfare states undertake by far most tasks of the welfare state. Europeanization thus has yet to manifest itself as a challenge to the Western European welfare states.

**Ageing populations**

Ageing of the population is perhaps the biggest and least contested component of the demographic challenges. The baby boom generation of the Second World War retire within the next 5-17 years, and since they did not reproduce themselves to establish a stable population growth, the share of the working age population will decline at the same time as the share of elderly rises. For example, in the past 25 years, the number of persons above 25 years of age in the Nordic countries increased with 1.3 million while the number of persons in the working active age between 15 and 65 years of age grew with 1.4 million (Eurostat 1999). In the coming 25 years lower fertility and increased longevity will result in an extra 1.9 million pensioners while the working age population shrinks by about 8.1 million (United Nations 1999). This tendency cuts across European countries where both EU 15 and the ten accession states in average experience an increase of 8 percentage point in the population share of elderly from 2000 to 2025 (Kvist 2002). Obviously, this puts pressure on national governments to maximise the number of potential workers.

In some countries low rates of female labour market participation has meant that efforts are made to increase the share of women on the labour market just as the EU has set a target of a female labour market participation rate at 60% by 2010, see Table 2. In general this calls for more rather than less state welfare in terms of child and old care services that help women to establish a better balance between work and family life. Such a professionalization of care services, however, may be challenged by shortage of labour. For example, in countries that already now have comprehensive public social services studies like the Nordic ones where the welfare state is an important employer for women (Hernes 1987; Kolberg 1991), national studies predicts that around one in four of current female students must become nurses and social workers if current levels of provision should be kept in the future.

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**Shorter working life**

The challenge of the ageing population has to be seen in light of a tendency across countries and socio-economic groups to make a later entry into, and an earlier exit from the labour market as well as prolonged longevity in European countries. In total, this means that fewer working people in the future will have to support more people outside the labour market (OECD 2000). When people retire later there is a “negative happy hour” effect for the exchequer in the sense that not only does one more person (continue) to pay taxes and contributions, but there is also one less person taking
out benefits. Combined with the large number of persons involved, this makes withdrawal of early exit from the labour market a substantial potential for increasing labour supply.

This helps explain why the EU has set a target of an employment-population rate of 50 per cent for people aged 55 to 65 years. Table 2 shows that less than a handful of the 25 countries meet this target. The elder part of the working aged have generally low participation rate in all countries irrespective of welfare regime. Whether shorter working life call for more or less state welfare is controversial. On the one hand it may require government to make unpopular decisions to reduce possibilities for early exit. This would be conceived as retrenchment by most scholars, and definitely by the persons concerned. On other hand such retrenchment measures may not alone help increase labour supply among the elder part of the working aged. It may also call for enacting more state welfare measures to, for example, combat age based discrimination and provide employers and ‘elderly’ greater incentives and possibilities.

Ethnic minorities
In many European countries, the – in most cases increasing – share of ethnic minorities in the population is often viewed as a problem. From a sociological perspective it may, for example, be discussed whether increasingly diverse populations are able to share the core values and norms that create the normative foundation of the welfare state. If not, social cohesion in the welfare state may be at odds. However, with regard to demographically induced redistribution challenges related to the ageing of populations discussed above, the ethnic minorities constitute a possibility of securing the economic sustainability of the welfare state rather than a threat. This is because of the age profile of ethnic minorities that is generally somewhat younger than the majority of natives. Coupled with lower labour market participation among many ethnic minority groups, this may provide a potential for increased labour supply in so far as ethnic minorities obtain jobs in the formal economy. Hence, from a demographic and economic point of view, increased shares of ethnic minorities are not a threat but rather a possibility for the securing the financial basis of the welfare state. Welfare reforms aimed at increasing labour market participation among ethnic minorities could thus be a means of alleviating part of the demographic challenge.

In sum, low fertility among the post World War II-generation is the main reason why welfare states are currently facing an ageing of the population. This puts pressure on the welfare state due to an expected increase in outlays, but, most importantly, a decrease of revenue to finance welfare schemes. The pressure is exacerbated by the tendency of older segments of able-bodied people in the labour market to retire earlier, and, probably less so, by increased longevity. To the extent that it is possible to increase the effective retirement age as well as the labour market participation of women and growing population shares of ethnic minorities such demographic challenges may be met in part. However, for this to succeed more rather than less public welfare and policy is likely to be required.

Individualisation
Need for welfare state reform is also sparked by an increased individualisation in society (e.g. Giddens 1991). The traditional family pattern of a male breadwinner is being replaced with a diversity of family forms, including a greater share of single parent household and two breadwinner households (Lewis 2001). To the extent that such families are able to balance family responsibilities with participation in the labour market, social policies may be accommodated to facilitate these new family configurations. Balancing work and family life is thus seen as an increasingly important issue confronting the welfare state at both the EU and national political agendas. In particular
policies supporting the traditional family in Continental and Southern Europe are seen as constituting disincentives for female labour market participation and fertility (see Esping-Andersen 2002). The counter position in Scandinavia of encompassing and subsidised care services for children and elderly may not only be an incentive for fertility and female labour market participation, but also come at the price of gender segregated labour markets and penalties on women’s wages (e.g. Gupta et al 2001).

In general, the diversification of individual life courses, de-standardisation of career and labour market participation patterns is most likely to call for more flexible social policy arrangements. In many respects welfare states have so far catered for the norms of the ‘traditional’ social risks associated with the nuclear families in industrialised society. Such social protection is provided primarily by income transfers in events like unemployment, sickness, old age, death (for survivors), and disability, schemes that often assume couples are in stable marriages (e.g. Arber et al. 2001). Married couples also still tend to have advantageous protection compared to cohabitating couples with respects to, for example, taxes, parental custody, and inheritance rules. In short, women and emerging family types are often discriminated against.

Importantly, care services are also to a large extent provided by the unwaged labour of women. Child and elder care as well as active social and labour market policies are just some of the policies called for to, respectively, better reconcile work and family life and improve the employment prospects of, especially, vulnerable groups in the labour market.

Given the growing share of singles, irregular families and a future shortage of labour, the need for ‘individualising’ social security and increasing the service side of the welfare state has grown significantly. Consequently, a substantial challenge to contemporary welfare states lays in modernising existing welfare arrangements to accommodate the social needs arising from individualisation of life courses and de-standardisation of families in post-industrial societies.

The popularity of the welfare state
Being an endemically political construct the welfare state always commands continual ideological support from its constituencies. During the 1960s and 1970s most welfare-state scholars claimed that the welfare states of Western Europe were suffering from an almost universal lack of legitimacy, and, as a consequence, they were facing a crisis of legitimacy (O’Connor 1973; Gough 1979). This “conventional” wisdom that public support for the welfare state was dangerously low persisted until the mid-1980s when newly founded cross-national surveys documented otherwise.\(^3\) Comparative studies have since then demonstrated quite unambiguously that the general level of support for most aspects of public welfare provision is very high in all Western European countries, cf. table 3 below (see also Papadakis and Bean 1993; Taylor-Gooby 1995). Additionally, the high level of support has been found to be relatively constant (at least) since the mid-1980s, and, interestingly, positive attitudes do not differ systematically between different welfare state regimes (Svallfors 1997; Bean and Papadakis 1998). Finally, studies show that the biggest differences in attitudes towards the welfare state are not to be found between different countries, but rather within countries themselves. Most importantly, as is also illustrated in table 3, individuals’ political preferences and a range of socio-economic characteristics are the main determinants of positive or negative attitudes (e.g. Papadakis 1993; Svallfors 1996).

\(^3\) Especially important comparative data sets are the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), The European Values Survey (EVS) and the Eurobarometer surveys. Beginning in 2003, the new European Social Survey (ESS) will continue this trend (see http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org).
Ironically, the recent empirical findings have turned the legitimacy debate of the 1970s on its head. The decisive question today is not what the consequences of lacking public support means for the sustainability of the welfare state, but rather which challenge its persisting popularity poses for the future of welfare. Neo-institutional theory within political science hold that the popularity of the welfare state is attributed to a self-reinforcing property in that, as increasing shares of the population have become recipients of some form of welfare benefit or service, then these people will react against attempts at curtailing already gained social rights. Consequently, the risk of electoral damage tends to make political actors and parties refrain from radical cuts and maintain political status quo (Pierson 1994).

Still, the fact that significant reforms have actually taken place during the 1990s in the Western European welfare states especially begs additional explanations. One strand of theory argues that the opinion patterns of executive and political elites is different from, and typically more pro-reformist than that of the general public (e.g. Sihvo and Uusitalo 1995; Blomberg and Kroll 1999). As a consequence, the propensity for carrying through policy change has increased. Furthermore, contextual factors such as the social construction of economic recession in the public sphere may ease voters’ acceptance of cutbacks in dire times (e.g. Cox 2001). This means that opposition to retrenchment or restructuring of the welfare state may become easier, but by no means easy. Consequently, weighing “push” and “pull” factors we find that the popularity of state welfare in the general public constitutes an important challenge to contemporary welfare states. Political developments over the past few decades show that reforming welfare states to meet new social demands in post-industrial societies is a difficult undertaking because existing welfare state programmes maintain their popularity over time. Thus, the political task of keeping the welfare state in line with changing needs by reforming or abolishing existing or creating new welfare programmes is also likely to be a prominent challenge in the future.

**Conclusion**

The aim of this article was to advance the study of the pressures facing post-industrial societies and the European welfare states proposed in recent work, and thereby contribute to the task of specifying how these pressures influence welfare reform. In the literature review we distinguish between the nature and impact of pressures on the welfare state, in terms of welfare state crisis, challenges and controversies. We find that the notion of ‘crisis’ used by some scholars as an all-encompassing condition that threatens the foundations of the welfare states has no empirical justification and should be abandoned. Current pressures on post-industrial societies are not potentially cataclysmic to welfare states. Rather we find that pressures differ in nature and in impact, where challenges call for some policy response whereas the impact of controversies remains an empirical question. Indeed it is often difficult *a priori* to establish a direct causal link from pressures on post-industrial societies to welfare reform. Most contemporary pressures are often controversies in that their potential impact is long-term and relatively uncertain.

The review also shows that the impact of the alleged exogenous challenges of globalization and Europeanization on welfare states has yet to be demonstrated. Globalization remains little more than a ‘buzz’-concept, mainly because its existence and impact on welfare states has so far not been established convincingly in the literature. The deepening and broadening of European integration may in the longer run affect national welfare states, but not in the short or medium term perspective.
National institutions and interest tend to prevail over the diffusion of ideas and the establishment of supranational institutions. Both pressures from Europeanization and globalization thus remain contested and should therefore rightfully be considered as controversies rather than challenges.

National endogenous pressures seem more important and less ambiguous. Demographic change is one of the most significant challenges common to the European countries. Low fertility and the increasing share of elderly in the populations pose a significant challenge to economic sustainability. Furthermore, the relative decline in the working aged population forces governments to seek new ways to increase employment, not least among the oldest segments of the labour force, women, ethnic minorities and groups on the margins of the labour market. In many of these instances extensions of welfare programmes and labour market policies rather than curtailments may be an appropriate solution, especially provision of childcare services, family benefits, and active labour market programmes. Activating labour “reservoirs” may be an important counterbalance to demographic and labour market challenges.

Another challenge for the welfare state is to handle the increasing individualisation of career and family patterns in post-industrial societies. These developments, especially in the long-term perspective, are likely to exert pressures for more flexible and customised social security programmes; both with respect to transfer incomes and social services. A final endogenous challenge consists in reforming welfare programmes with entrenched popularity.

On the theoretical level, this review suggests that mature welfare states face a partly new set of challenges in post-industrial societies compared to the ‘traditional’ problems associated with the industrial era. New diversities and social risks have emerged, and the evidence presented suggests that these new challenges should not necessarily be met with curtailment but rather also with expansions of welfare programmes. Moreover, pressures on post-industrial societies not only create a need for welfare reform, but also give possibilities for welfare reform. For example, increased labour shortages makes it possible to direct resources away from compensation in the form of different types of benefits for the unemployed to a greater emphasis on preventive measures, also to groups that in times of high unemployment may have been neglected. The current wave of European disability pension reforms bear witness to this. In short, the content of pressures and their relationship to welfare reform need further examination. Much of societal change seems to call for more rather that less state welfare; new types of welfare states may be needed in a post-industrial society.
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<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Controversy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Societal context</td>
<td>Industrial society</td>
<td>(Post-) Industrial society</td>
<td>Post-industrial society</td>
<td>Post-industrial society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notion of pressure</td>
<td>Exogenous objective pressures of industrialism</td>
<td>Pressures are symptoms of structural contradictions/deficiencies in welfare states</td>
<td>Pressures pose calling for political action</td>
<td>Objective implications of pressure contested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy impact</td>
<td>Gradual reform/adaptation</td>
<td>Radical systemic reform imminent/required</td>
<td>Gradual adaptation, retrenchment/restructuring</td>
<td>Status quo - irrelevant, expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare state context</td>
<td>Emerging/expanding</td>
<td>Consolidating/maturing</td>
<td>Mature</td>
<td>Mature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed response pattern</td>
<td>More state welfare</td>
<td>Radically less state welfare</td>
<td>Less and/or more efficient state welfare</td>
<td>Mostly more state welfare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Four concepts of welfare state pressures
Table 2. EU employment-population targets and rates according to country, gender and age, 2001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population 15 to 65 years of age</th>
<th>Population aged 55 to 65 years of age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU targets for 2010</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU 15 average</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current EU member states</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>80.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>72.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coming EU member states</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>73.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Per cent in agreement with statements, 1996.

*It is the responsibility of government to ...* Provide a decent standard of living Provide a job for Provide a decent standard of living
for the elderly everybody who for the unemployed
wants one

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Provide a decent standard of living for the elderly</th>
<th>Provide a job for everybody who wants one</th>
<th>Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour market status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in labour force</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of trade union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour market status</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in labour force</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of trade union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour market status</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>89</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in labour force</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of trade union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>91</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Social Survey Programme, “Role of government” 1996. Numbers indicate proportion of respondents who answered that it “definitely” and “probably” is the responsibility of the government to provide the given service. Alternative answers are “probably not” and “definitely not”. Percentages are rounded.